In the attache article, Ralph Clark provides an understanding as it relates to his company’s (ShotSpotter) gun fire acoustic detection application and the recent negative focus it has received from critics who have not conducted an objective analysis of the tool, its algorithms, processes, and the value it is providing police departments across the country who face the scourge of gun violence.
Advancing a robust crime gun intelligence capability requires a multitude of handoffs and handshakes among a diverse group of independent stakeholders that include: a) the police (investigators, analysts, commanders), b) forensic technicians, c) prosecutors, and d) the public. Each of these stakeholder groups have their own mission sets, goals, objectives, and often language. As such, each may view the processes involved with crime gun intelligence, and for that matter how they contribute to public safety slightly differently.
Because NIBIN is such a fundamental component toward safeguarding the public from gun violence and arresting serial shooters it Is critical that efforts are made to explain the use, benefit, and ultimate objectives of NIBIN. Forensic technicians who work with NIBIN understand the forensic value of NIBIN, but may also need to understand how investigators can benefit not only from the evidentiary value that NIBIN provides, but the intelligence – or premonitory – value it can provide to investigators. Investigators require an understanding of exactly what NIBIN can provide them from both an evidentiary and premonitory perspective. Prosecutors require not only an understanding of how NIBIN supports both forensic and investigative processes, but how they can use it to advance their cases within the courtroom. And of course, the public needs to understand how NIBIN provides law enforcement a precision based tool for curtailing gun violence and arresting and prosecuting serial shooters.
Robert Troyer, former United States Attorney of Colorado, takes on the challenge of providing prosecutors that understanding of NIBIN in his recently released “NIBIN Toolkit for Prosecutors.” The toolkit covers the following topics:
What NIBIN is and isn’t.
How the NIBIN process works.
How a prosecutor can benefit from NIBIN.
Answers to frequently asked questions.
Links to reference materials.
Common terms and definitions.
Models, including witness outlines, warrant/complaint affidavit language,demonstrative images and diagrams, and language for common courtroom presentations and pleadings.
By improving the understanding of NIBIN it will make it easier for prosecutors to take advantage of the benefits of this tool and at the same time weave NIBIN deeper into the fabric of criminal prosecution to maximize its public-safety impact. NIBIN can enable prosecutors to leverage this firearm-crime reduction technology to help convict dangerous criminals and to protect those convictions on appeal. Overall, this toolkit is aimed at assisting prosecutors tackle cases involving NIBIN.
The toolkit can be found by visiting the following link:
How do you stop gun violence when it reaches a point that an innocent 13-year-old is gunned down while taking the trash out on Christmas Day? You do everything in your power, you marshal your forces, and you deploy them using a proven plan. Building a crime gun intelligence program requires a will to make changes and embrace innovations to address violent crimes in one’s jurisdiction.
Join me in this webinar, hosted by the Justice Clearinghouse, where I discuss the foundational components involved with the New Jersey State Police’s adoption of a rigorous crime gun intelligence capability, which continues to innovate making it a model to adopt.
The attached video provides a summary understanding of how a robust NIBIN program is the foundation of an effective crime gun intelligence capability necessary for addressing recidivist shooters and connecting shooting events.
A critical component toward advancing Crime Gun Intelligence (CGI) strategies is the formation of true collaborative partnerships among the diverse stakeholders within a specific Area of Responsibility (AOR) and/or a Regional Shooting Environment (RSE). An RSE can be defined as a geographical area in which the same criminals and/or criminal groups operate within. Depending on the law enforcement jurisdiction, and the geographical/civic boundaries, an AOR may include single or multiple RSEs. Some law enforcement jurisdictions at the federal, state, or county levels may be far reaching enough that they have multiple RSEs within their AOR, which touch upon multiple law enforcement jurisdictions and require the formation of partnerships to effectively manage. For example, consider an AOR from an ATF Field Division perspective or from the perspective of a state or county law enforcement organization. It is easy to see how they could have multiple RSE’s that are wide in scope and may cross over into other counties or states. These AORs will have multiple RSEs (e.g. hot spots/pockets) within them shaped in irregular formations, which are often outlined by factors such as local highways, interstate highways, as well as other land masses. Of course, some urban jurisdictions are large enough that they too may contain multiple RSE’s in them as well. Each of violent crime environs in each RSE could be slightly different depending on the criminals or criminal groups within them. It is therefore vital to a CGI program that partnerships among all law enforcement agencies that operate within each RSE are prioritized to ensure that agencies can collaborate in a manner that leverages each other’s people, processes, and technology. The purpose of this primer is to highlight ways in which leaders can pull together the disparate stakeholders that are critical to a well-functioning CGI capability in order to exchange ideas and resources effectively and efficiently to tackle violent crime problems.
All CGI AOR/RSEs have different stakeholders to consider. While primarily members of the law enforcement community, CGI stakeholders come from agencies that are dissimilar in organizational structure from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Of equal importance to consider, is the familiarity or experience level that a particular stakeholder or stakeholder group has as it relates to advancing the core elements of crime gun intelligence: NIBIN information, eTrace data, and local intelligence. The recent publication of the Crime Gun Intelligence – Disrupting the Shooting Cycle Best Practices for implementing successful crime gun intelligence programs guide is a handbook that was desperately needed for law enforcement members to understand the best practices that surround the development of an effective crime gun intelligence program. It was the first governmental document, more specifically, from the ATF, that outlines that the start of the crime gun intelligence process begins with the collection of ballistic evidence and submission to a laboratory or NIBIN site. It went further by delineating how effective crime gun intelligence programs emphasize comprehensiveness and timeliness as it relates to ballistic screening, tracing firearms, and acting upon investigative leads. This primer is an accompaniment to that earlier guide. It focuses on the vital importance of agency partnerships, and how they are crucial for advancing a crime gun intelligence capability and/or strategy committed to the timely processing of ballistic evidence from submission to investigative follow up.
This primer seeks to describe the importance of creating a shared purpose among a diverse CGI stakeholder group that can engender communication, collaboration and coordination across the RSEs. Second, it is designed to offer a checklist for senior level policy advocates to utilize, in whole or in part, when establishing or further sustaining a CGI stakeholder capability.
Embracing a “shared purpose” to advance CGI strategies
What makes a CGI capability both advantageous to combating violent crime as well as challenging to establish on the front end and sustain on the back end, is actually the same thing – a triumvirate of interdependent stakeholders (see figure 1). The entities that need to contribute to the CGI paradigm are diverse in their nature, their mission, and their make-up. It is this diversity that is an overall strength to a gun violence program, yet it can also be a significant challenge in terms of harnessing the disparate entities. A constructive CGI capability requires participation from police commanders and investigators. While also requiring the technical skills and equipment of forensic laboratory personnel, and the legal acumen of state and Federal prosecutors. In other words, the stakeholder groups listed above and delineated in the adjacent illustration must work together to achieve success. To that end, in order to pull these diverse stakeholders together, who have entirely separate missions, it is critical that they find a shared purpose that can align them.
A shared purpose can serve as the end state for CGI stakeholders, and allow them to effectively harness their diverse mission capabilities to achieve both their individual and group goals. The end state, in the most basic form is simple and needs to be stressed and understood by all stakeholders involved. When advancing the practice of crime gun intelligence, every stakeholder must hold the value of collaboration, and its connotation of thinking and acting together, among their diverse partners as central to a shared purpose ofdeveloping and executing a sustainable comprehensive crime gun intelligence strategy for law enforcement that seeks justice, resolution, and peace for all involved.
It is not enough to say that reducing violent crime requires a shared purpose among interagency partners. Instead it is vital that all components of the interagency community within a particular AOR and its RSEs charged with reducing violent crime understand why a shared purpose is fundamental to solidifying partnerships, which in turn result in greater opportunities for communication and collaboration. The reduction of violent crime is no easy task and requires a combination of stakeholders that may not normally communicate or collaborate routinely. For example, it is not often that line level policy personnel, whether it be a detective or the patrol officer responsible for collecting ballistic evidence found on a street have the opportunity or structure to collaborate with the firearm examiner within the ballistic lab, or for that matter investigators or analysts from the ATF. It is no different when you add state or federal level prosecutors to the equation and their familiarity with detectives or state level analysts. An unintended consequence of the specialization that underpins the greater law enforcement community has been the creation of silos that often prevent communication, coordination, and collaboration. While silos at some level or another are detrimental to law enforcement practices, at both the strategic and tactical levels, there is nowhere more noticeable than when they are present in the RSEs within the AOR’s seeking to advance crime gun strategies. In the most basic terms, advancing crime gun intelligence strategies requires many “handoffs and handshakes” among interagency partners who must have trust in one another.
It is therefore critical that the within any particular AOR/RSE, there is a champion(s) that can lead the efforts needed to establish and sustain a shared purpose among the varied interagency community stakeholders that may exist within that jurisdiction. In some AOR’s this will be the ATF SAC, in other areas it will be Chief or Deputy Chief of Police, in other areas it may be a lead prosecutor or the elected leader of a City, County or State. It can often be that skilled professional with that magnanimous personality and well-respected reputation that can inspire and motivate action among the diverse constituents needed to advance crime gun intelligence. There is no cookie cutter solution, since the dynamics of every AOR/RSE are different and the skill levels and interest of participants also vary widely. It is critical that this champion be the one who advances the efforts to develop capabilities aimed at:
· Comprehensive collection of ballistic evidence
· Timely turnaround of NIBIN leads
· Rapid follow-up of NIBIN leads, and
· Sharing feedback to all stakeholders
none of this can be achieved without the help of an interagency stakeholder group that values and shares a common purpose. Each stakeholder within a particular AOR has different needs. The detective or Special Agent charged with addressing violent crime in a particular AOR will view ballistic data differently than the ballistic lab technician. And the prosecutor will view this information from a slightly different lens. The three mission areas of these different stakeholders if not understood against the backdrop of the intended end state of a successful crime gun intelligence and violent crime suppression strategy will only serve to complicate things and undermine efforts needed to increase and leverage collaboration. So, it will be their shared purpose that unites and drives them toward a common vision of an end state focused on the most important thing “justice for the victims, resolution for the loved ones impacted by violent crime, and peace to the community.” This simple end state when communicated and shared among the stakeholders offers each of the mission areas described above to continue to advance their specialization. Too often, investigators, lab personnel, and prosecutors hold to a view that their specific function is the end state in itself and miss the much broader importance of justice, resolution, and peace.
The stakeholders needed to advance crime gun intelligence and violent crime suppression strategies come in three distinct yet interdependent forms: the police (patrol, investigators, and analysts), laboratory technicians, and prosecutors. Bringing these diverse entities together in a meaningful way communicate, coordinate, and collaborate towards the shared purpose it the responsibility of a senior level policy advocate. This champion within a particular AOR is charges with harnessing the knowledge, skills, and abilities of these stakeholders into two definite groups. The champion may well be the SAC, or it may be someone within the ATF Field Division or from a partner agency that has the clout to bring people together for a shared purpose. While the mechanics or managing stakeholder engagement is outlined in Task One of The 13 Critical Tasks, in summary it involves formulating two groups of stakeholders. A Strategic Group made up of key senior managers representing the three key perspectives: the police, forensic, and prosecutorial elements. It is critical that senior level representatives from local, county, state, and federal agencies be part of the Strategic Group. This group is responsible for creating a vision, mandating new policy, providing guidance and direction, and requesting resources to advance crime gun intelligence and crime suppression strategies. The second group is the Tactical Group comprised of practitioners is made up of mid-level managers, front line supervisors, and technical subject matter experts. It is the responsibility of the champion discussed above to bring together the Strategic Group and by doing so identify specific individuals from the diverse agencies involved that should make up the Tactical Group.
The Strategic Group is critical because without it, necessary resources, policies, strategies, and protocols cannot be advanced in a manner that considers the vital importance of a shared vision. What follows is a recommended checklist that the senior level policy advocate, the champion, can utilize as an aid to formulate the Strategic Group. Once the Strategic Group is established and begins to meet the nature byproduct will be the formulation of the Tactical Group. The recommended checklist, in whole or in part, can provide the senior level policy advocate steps needed to formulate the important Strategic Group.
Critical steps for formulating key stakeholder groups
Convening stakeholders for any endeavor, particularly when those needing to be involved fall outside the span of control of a single organization charged with advancing an effort, can be a challenging and burdensome. Collaboration and teamwork are not intuitive practices, and best not left to chance when priority initiatives are counting on the input and feedback of diverse entities. As stated above, CGI capabilities require solid partnerships among the triumvirate components within the law enforcement community, open and timely information and intelligence sharing, and cross-jurisdictional leadership buy-in. These key elements, whether in part or in whole, are not learned activities. Each stakeholder member that will be counted on to advance a respective CGI program, will likely have never received training in any of these areas.
To assist with formulating key stakeholder groups for advancing CGI, seven critical steps have been identified. Following these steps can be of great assistance when establishing and sustaining key stakeholder groups. Figure 2 depicts the seven critical steps, and an explanation of each of these steps follows.
Identify senior policy oriented/cross-jurisdictional stakeholders (e.g. police/LE, forensic, prosecutors) in your AOR/RSEs to participate.
o Identification of stakeholders is a continuous process that requires significant attention by the CGI champion(s). Yet, identifying all possible key stakeholders at an early stage of a CGI initiative and involving them in project planning can pay dividends. These dividends come not only in the form of knowledge, resources, and equipment, but can also ease tensions when interjurisdictional challenges arise. Involving senior leadership, representing police, forensic, and prosecutorial partners, can assure that stakeholder discussions will take root in those respective agencies represented. Having senior policy-oriented champions mixed with operational level subject matter experts can increase the speed at which CGI messaging can spread across a particular AOR.
Prepare an invitation letter to identified policy-oriented stakeholders requesting their presence at a CGI stakeholder meeting. Request they bring with them any forensic, investigative, and intelligence representatives that they rely on within their organizations to combat violent crime.
o Often the success of hosting a CGI key stakeholders group meeting hinges on the planning on the front end. Getting the right people at the initial meeting is vital toward advancing the enterprise. Yet, getting the right people requires effort. Key stakeholders should also be contacted in person or by telephone – after an invitation letter is sent – to explain what the CGI stakeholder group seeks to achieve and why a particular individual is being invited. Neglecting this important component can adversely impact the group, since many key stakeholders if not specifically requested will send designees that may not possess the requisite skill sets, or the status needed to advance the CGI strategies in a particular AOR. The contact explaining an upcoming stakeholder meeting should be followed by a formal invitation letter that not only specifically requests an individual’s presence but explain what the CGI stakeholder group seeks to achieve. If a strong coalition already exists with a partner agency(s), it may be prudent to include multiple signatures on the letter. Read ahead materials, specifically, the CGI Best Practices Guide and the draft scoping document discussed above, should be provided to invitees. These documents will assist with preparing invitees prior to the meeting.
Collect and collate material that can be shared with stakeholders in advance of the stakeholder’s meeting that details best practices related to combating gun crime, for example the International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Firearm’s Recovery Policy that outlines a) responding and collecting, b) extracting and analyzing, and c) pursuing and apprehending, and the disrupting the shooting cycle.[1]
o It should be understood that the stakeholder’s meeting may contain participants with varying levels of experience. To that end, it would prudent to produce and share a short summary document that explains in advance the principles of CGI that the stakeholder group aims to establish and practice. In addition, national level CGI related documents can be included in the package for each stakeholder and well as localized policies, protocols, and practices that may already be in place within the RSI. This will be an effort well spent and will be vital information for key stakeholders to understand as they endeavor to support, advance, and sustain CGI strategies. Additionally, distilling this information into an executive level brief will level set expectations among stakeholders and assist with strengthening or growing future capabilities.
2.Think and act together
Identify a strong facilitator that can assist with developing an agenda and that can facilitate the meeting in a manner using the CGI best practice guide to assess the current capabilities for the comprehensive collection of intelligence, timeliness of collection, processing and dissemination, and advance future initiatives needed to overcome obstacles and bridge gaps.
o Planning for a successful stakeholder meeting should include identifying a strong facilitator that has credibility among the interagency partners that will be invited. This facilitator can develop an agenda by leveraging the CGI Best Practice Guide in a manner that can assess current CGI capabilities within an AOR. The facilitator’s agenda should include discussion regarding the group’s shared purpose, scope, and vision, the current capabilities for the comprehensive collection of intelligence, timeliness of collection, processing and dissemination, and the advancement of future initiatives needed to address gaps. Additionally, an independent facilitator can ‘take the heat” for broaching sensitive areas thereby preventing lasting hard feelings among the players who must continue to work together.
Host initial meeting (and schedule follow up meetings) that provide forums for open discussion aimed at leveraging capabilities to address gun violence both strategically and operationally.
o While ATF is appropriately resourced to shepherd the CGI enterprise in a particular AOR, it is critical that the ownership of the overall effort is dispersed in an appropriately balanced manner across the interagency stakeholder group. Each stakeholder must understand that CGI capabilities are a shared enterprise and that the ATF is there to help shepherd but not to advance alone. Hosting the initial CGI stakeholder group meeting in a location that conveys a sense of partnership and collaboration can energize individual stakeholders to take ownership of the enterprise. The initial, and follow up meetings, should be formal in their setting and follow an agenda that while not only understands the time constraints of many of the participants but lends itself for discussing and actioning items that needs attention.
3.Define and Document the Roles of each stakeholder
Outline the different roles, needs, and mission sets of each stakeholder.
o Successful CGI initiatives have demonstrated solid trusted partnerships among police, forensic experts, and prosecutors. Yet, the very nature of these distinct disciplines has historically created silos from one another in many AORs across the nation. It is important to understand the different needs and missions of each stakeholder prior to advancing a stakeholder meeting. While not a simple or easy task, it is essential to determines as many requirements as possible that a particular stakeholder may have. For example, will the forensic stakeholder cite accreditation standards that may create obstacles for advancing CGI initiatives in a rapid and timely manner. Having this information on the front end can assist a respective the CGI champion(s) with determining what research they may to conduct prior to advancing a stakeholder meeting. Often times, a phone call from the CGI champion(s) to a key stakeholder to explain the development of a stakeholder group can elicit needs and mission area prior to a formal stakeholder meeting.
Understand the various NIBIN processing environment(s) which may be operating within the AOR/RSE’s (e.g. Local agency, Regional/County, Statewide).
o Similar to the forensic and ballistic lab servicing options outlined above, the way in which AORs process NIBIN in particular jurisdictions also run the gamut. Some AORs may have a limited number of NIBIN processing centers, while other AORs may have a multitude. Having an in depth understanding of how NIBIN is processed in a respective AOR – from acquisition to correlation is vital and mapping out how these processes are advanced will also support later stakeholder discussions that will focus on effective and efficient CGI strategies. Again, it is vitally important to understand, who does what, where, when, and how.
Identify the forensic and ballistic labs servicing the respective AOR/RSEs.
o There is no one size fits all as it relates to how forensic or ballistic services are applied in AORs/RSE’s across the nation. Some AORs/RSEs, particular those of major metropolitan areas, may have forensic and ballistic lab services all contained under the “one roof” of a police agency. But what seems to be the more common practice is a diversified shared service model where a respective policy agency may handle an investigation in whole or in part, but rely on other agencies, whether a county or state to provide forensic and ballistic lab services. Some AORs/RSEs may have a host of different systems in place because of capabilities and historical precedent. Whatever the forensic and ballistic lab capability is for a particular AOR/RSEs it is vital for it to be mapped out to support later stakeholder discussions that can focus on effective and efficient CGI strategies. It is vitally important to know who does what, where, when, and how. For example, a problem in one Northeast jurisdiction is that while seized guns are sent out for DNA swabbing, they are handled by a different agency that does not understand nor recognize the timeliness requirement for the ballistics technicians in another agency to test fire the weapon and enter the test fired cartridge case into NIBIN in order to provide investigators with fresh and actionable investigative leads.
Identify intelligence units, fusion centers, and other analytical entities that assess violent crime in the respective AOR/RSE and if they receive NIBIN hit information and other types of CGI.
o Processing NIBIN information is not complete until Intelligence or analytical entities have the opportunity to assess the raw information in order to add value and increase the manner in which the information can be actioned. A byproduct of a successful CGI capability in a given AOR is the abundance of lead information that is produced. What often follows are investigative entities trying to stay afloat in a churning sea of NIBIN lead information with no concrete ability to triage and prioritize leads. While the ATF proposes the GETS method for NIBIN lead prioritization this cannot be achieved unless there are dedicated intelligence or analytical resources to focus on the abundance of leads and assess them accordingly. Identifying intelligence units, fusion centers, and other analytical entities within a given AOR to conduct such work is a keystone of advancing CGI capabilities. Some AORs will have a multitude of entities to leverage and the challenge may very well be to develop processes that ensure communication, coordination and collaboration.
Identify databases used within the AOR/RSE to store and share violent crime related information and NIBIN information (e.g. NESS, ShotSpotter, APLR, Gang, Street CCTV systems, etc.).
o CGI is a blend of NIBIN, eTrace, and local intelligence information, which runs the gamut depending on the local capabilities (i.e. gun fire auditory detection, ALPR, CCTV, criminal intelligence, etc.). With that said, it is important that stakeholders understand the different databases that an AOR may have that contains information and intelligence related to violent crime and NIBIN. For the stakeholders, this information may inform efforts to streamline access or to ensure that all data and information is exploited by investigators and Prosecutors. Mapping out how violent crime and NIBIN information is accessed and shared can reveal opportunities to strengthen or bolster existing capabilities. Access to databases may come in different “shapes and sizes” for each jurisdiction depending on its capabilities. Additionally, access to the ATF’s NESS system is contingent on a variety of factors as this important database is being rolled out. Recognizing what other databases are at play in a particular AOR – even if they are proprietary – is important toward developing that community approach needed to combat violent crime. Not understanding the divergent databases in a particular AOR will create unwanted surprises that can degrade trust in a stakeholder group.
4.Define and coalesce around a shared purpose
Leverage the stakeholder group to define the shared purpose among the stakeholders.
o The initial stakeholder meeting may in fact generate information that expands outside the scope of what was originally intended with the agenda. While it may not be suitable for the stakeholder group to address every issue raised, it is imperative that this information is assessed for its value in establishing and sustaining a robust CGI stakeholder group. In short, the stakeholder group should always return to its overall purpose when triaging issues: address the gaps and obstacles affecting data collection, forensic and investigative capabilities and in timely follow up and evaluation. Within ten days, an after-action report from the meeting should be circulated to the key stakeholder group, which focuses on the timely follow up of identified issues. Of critical importance, is the timely follow up of issues. If there is one takeaway that a stakeholder group must understand, and respect is the importance investigative follow-up and evaluation. Without these elements, a stakeholder group will quickly lose it contributive value. The stakeholders group needs to consider within the strategic plan a mechanism for formalizing the relationship among the group. For example, is a memorandum of understanding an option, or a joint doctrine document signed by the senior leaders? Regardless, formalizing the stakeholder group is important for sustainability.
5.Develop a comprehensive integrated strategy
Develop a strategic plan around the shared purpose that includes vision, mission, and a tactical implementation plan addressing the 5 core concepts of CGI (e.g. collect, analyze, refer, track, and support) all guided by the National Crime Gun Intelligence Governing Board’s best practice guide, Disrupting the shooting cycle.
o Regardless of the AOR, the basic elements of a CGI enterprise include people, processes, and technology. However, each AOR has its own identity in terms of available resources, expertise, and challenges. Building cohesion within a CGI stakeholder group begins with developing a shared vision. Kickstarting this effort requires the drafting of a vision, mission, and values statement for the group. By circulating the draft scoping document among the key stakeholders and later discussing and finalizing the document at the future stakeholder meetings can produce early buy-in among participants. The buy-in translates into a shared purpose among the diverse entities that the CGI stakeholder will ultimately contain.
Identify a team(s) of tactical experts in those areas of CGI needing improvement (e.g. comprehensiveness, timeliness, accessibility) and charge them with identifying obstacles and gaps and recommending solutions. (e.g. mapping out the current process flow for law enforcement agencies to collect ballistic evidence, submit ballistic evidence for entry into NIBIN, and how information is shared back to the submitting agency).
o Many of the key stakeholders invited into the group may not be particular subject matter experts regarding CGI but need to be part of the group because of their status in the AOR’s law enforcement community. That said, identifying tactical experts that understand CGI components in a particular AOR and can brief on the strengths and challenges of them can add tremendous credibility to a key stakeholder group and associated meetings. The mapping of process flows related to the collection and submission of ballistic evidence and how information is shared can be best articulated by those closest to the practice. The mapping of the various forensic operational processes will inevitably highlight the chokepoints causing delays that the key stakeholder group can address.
6.Organize for strategic success
Create a sustainable infrastructure that supports scheduled meetings, efficient and effective execution of the strategic plan, and the right information sharing platform to help achieve the strategic vision according to the shared purposed identified by the stakeholder group.
o Unfortunately, there is no one template solution for creating a sustainable infrastructure for a CGI stakeholder group. The individual dynamics of each AOR/RSE are such that too many disparities exist to have one cookie cutter solution. One option is to identify a CGI champion that can work both behind the scenes and out front during the stakeholder meetings to “nudge” things along. In some AOR’s a CGI champion will be evident based on “that persona” who comes to mind. For example, in New Jersey, regardless of the agency when gun crime is discussed in the state a particular lieutenant assigned to the state’s fusion center is everyone’s choice for the CGI champion because he knows the business, is extremely approachable, and is not agency centric when advancing strategies. In some jurisdictions, it may be trial and error, or it may be two individuals working together to champion the concepts of CGI. The places in which to look first for champions are clear and predictable. For example, the ATF SAC can provide tremendous assistance here by providing the forum where key senior policy oriented/cross jurisdictional stakeholders can convene and, in the process, select the CGI champion. We should never discount the ATF SAC nor a Chief nor Lead Prosecutor, nor Crime Lab Director as the natural CGI champion for a particular AOR/RSE. Notwithstanding, Champions may also include others. Therefore, regardless, of who the CGI champion is, that person will be working closely on a day-to-day basis with the Chief Law Enforcement Officers (e.g. Police Chief, ATF SAC, etc.), Lead Prosecutors and Crime Lab Directors to establish and sustain stakeholder values that surround the critical capability of CGI. Appendix II has some examples of how different stakeholder groups are organized.
7.Measure and monitor progress
Identify what is working and what is not and develop a plan for correcting deficiencies related to gaps in collection, forensic and investigative capabilities and the prioritization of timely follow up and evaluation.
o The stakeholder group can be influential in assessing performance and recommending improvements to the overall CGI enterprise. However, in order to advance this critical component a process must be identified and agreed upon. Will the turnaround of NIBIN leads be the primary factor? Will the sharing of lead information or the investigative follow up on leads be assessed? Performance review in a particular CGI AOR may be contingent on the maturity level of the enterprise. Moreover, while a CGI enterprise in a particular AOR may focus on NIBIN turnaround times in the first several months of its existence it can be modified to assess other components outlined in the Best Practice Guide as the maturity level increases. This iterative approach requires the stakeholder group to constantly conduct performance review on current processes and assess those processes against the intended outcomes of a robust CGI strategy. This can be a simple as asking the group what’s working and what’s not. They should keep doing what works and fix what’s not. The important thing is to build this review into the strategic plan of the enterprise.
Ensure that successes are documented and influences continued support among stakeholders, bolsters the public trust in policing, and communicates understanding of the program and its value.
o While demonstrated to be a critical component of a violent crime suppression effort in a particular AOR, so often opportunities are lost to describe and catalog how CGI strategies were integral in combating such crime. Stakeholders must share in the understanding that capturing and communicating success stories that can bolster public trust in policing must be communicated broadly to underpin and sustain a CGI program into the future. There is no cookie cutter solution for documenting and sharing success stories but working directly with ATF Public Affairs and Visual Arts sections to produce effective communications collateralcan assist with outlining a communication strategy that can be leveraged when opportunities present themselves. Furthermore, naysayers may latch onto to unfounded claims to disparage programs such as NIBIN in order to rationalize their non-participation. Data refuting false claims should be collected and communicated before a single voice turns into a chorus. For example, in one area of the country there are claims that the gun crimes they see are local and not cross-jurisdictional in nature, therefore a ballistic information sharing network is not needed. Indeed, if there is evidence to show that this claim is incorrect, it should be collected and communicated.
Understanding the Shooting Environment
While outside the scope of this primer, it is still important to highlight the critical importance of analysis as it relates to informing CGI policy and strategy concerning stakeholder groups. An analysis of AOR’s/RSEs shooting environment can be helpful to not only ensure who should be invited in as a stakeholder, but what agencies may need assistance with resourcing in order to ensure that the overall CGI capability is robust enough to service the larger stakeholder community. For example, an analysis of region’s shooting environment may identify that a particular urban center may frequently have shooting associations, via NIBIN, to a smaller neighboring town. If that neighboring town, regardless of the distance away from that identified urban area does not have the capabilities to rapidly collect ballistic evidence and submit it to the NIBIN lab in a timely manner, then the ability to capitalize off of lead information may be lost. Additionally, an analysis of a particular shooting environment may reveal that associations among shooting investigations highlight a pattern of a preferred route of travel shooters or their associates may use. If that route of travel is patrolled by a law enforcement agency that is not aware of the importance of capturing certain information during crime gun arrests or more importantly processing illegally possessed firearms in a timely manner than all opportunities for associating shooting investigations across the AOR’s/RSEs with the recovered “crime guns” will be squandered. In other words, the gun in City A’s homicide investigation may well be sitting in Town B’s property room 20 miles away taken into custody during drug investigation.
The analysis capability is so often overlooked as an essential planning tool. Many executives from law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies that will have the opportunity to read this primer may themselves not have the analytical capability need to assist them with interpreting their own shooting environment. Fortunately, there are several options for assistance in this endeavor. First, the ATF Field Division responsible for a given AOR has the resources to provide an understanding of the shooting environment. Second, the urban area or state fusion center for which the AOR/RSE falls within has the capabilities to provide the analysis listed above. And lastly, if there is a HIDTA region that the AOR/RSE falls within then that entity would also have the capabilities and resources to provide the necessary analysis associated with violent crime in a given AOR. Nonetheless, using analysis to inform the checklist is a prudent measure by stakeholder groups, regardless of their maturity level.
Conclusion
As delineated in this primer, the core component needed to advance successful CGI strategies is collaboration, whereby the diverse partners in a given AOR truly think and act together. It is therefore the expectation that the senior law enforcement leadership in any given AOR seeks to address gun violence and becomes the stewards responsible for cultivating and sustaining a community of interest based upon trusted partnerships. These stewards, by establishing and communicating a shared purpose across their community of interest can harness the disparate knowledge, skills, and abilities of the police, forensic experts, and the prosecutors – all of whom have a key role to play in seeking justice, providing resolution, and restoring peace for all involved in gun violence. This content is by no means a one size fits all document for AORs to follow when establishing and sustaining a crime gun intelligence program. Instead, it is a useful supplement to other guidance documents that provide information on how implement principles necessary for senior policy leaders and practitioners to advance successful CGI programs.
[1]NOTE: Many of the RSE stakeholders will be members of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Therefore, using the IACP policy can greatly assist with mapping the group to a shared purpose and help move the process along more smoothly as there is familiarity and trust in this professional orgazaiton.
One hot afternoon in the summer of 2016, the loud piercing sound of gunshots interrupted what should have been a lazy ride to the Jersey Shore for many travelling on the Atlantic City Expressway. What quickly unfolded in broad daylight on an otherwise serene roadway was a rolling gun battle between two rival drug factions. Two males in a black pick-up truck came up upon a white SUV and opened fire. The occupants in the SUV returned fire, and for several highway miles a shootout, reminiscent of a Hollywood action movie, played out on the eastbound lanes of the expressway. When it was all over, and the SUV came to rest at a nearby convenience store off the highway, one man was killed, and four others were injured. It was later learned that the driver of the black pickup truck had also been shot but was able to drive himself to a hospital in Philadelphia. For the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) making sense of this expansive crime scene, conflicting 911 calls, disparate witness statements, the body of the deceased, discarded weapons, and multiple shell casings belonging to four different weapons including a high-powered automatic rifle would surely be a challenge.
The rapid identification and arrest of perpetrators is what investigators strive for in order to stop armed criminals before they can do more harm, and by all accounts as we will later learn the above investigation was textbook in that regard. So often, because the cops are always on to another caper, we often don’t take the time to “rewind the tapes” and learn why investigators are successful in some instances and unsuccessful in others. In short, what would make the NJSP successful in this investigation – in addition to their skilled detectives – was the rapid access to critical pieces of information, from disparate sources, that they could essentially layer upon one another to make sense of an otherwise complex and confusion crime.
What is Crime Gun Intelligence?
Intelligence is one of those often-misunderstood terms that is thrown about in the lexicons of the military, law enforcement, and public safety. While it is outside the scope of this primer to define intelligence, it is worth noting that at the most fundamental level, intelligence is about understanding problems, and “really good” intelligence is about being able to do something with that intelligence. With that as a backdrop, crime gun intelligence (CGI) is the combining of investigative and forensic information to help investigators, analysts, commanders, and prosecutors better understand a particular shooting environment, while at the same time providing the actionable investigative lead information that can be used to further an investigation or prosecution.[1]
The Building Blocks of Crime Gun Intelligence
Those applying CGI to better understand the armed criminal environment draw their information sets from three basic building blocks or major areas that include: the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN), Electronic Tracing system (eTrace), and local intelligence sources. NIBIN, hosted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) is a national database of digital images of cartridge cases that were either collected as evidence from crime scenes or test fired from seized crime guns. NIBIN can help police connect crimes, guns and suspects.
Additionally, ATF’s eTrace offers a systematic way of tracking the transactional history of recovered crime guns from its manufacturer or importer and ultimately to the last known retail purchase from a federally licensed firearms dealer. The eTrace system can help police generate crime gun intelligence of tactical and strategic value. Tactically, it can help police follow the path of a murder weapon right into the shooter’s hands. Strategically, it can help law enforcement officers and policy makers better understand the crime gun market in their area and uncover black market gun trafficking schemes.
Lastly, the local intelligence area consists of law enforcement information and criminal intelligence sources, specific to a jurisdiction or region, which can run the gamut. This CGI component can be furthered divided into three subcomponents: a) local law enforcement information, b) other forensic data, and c) additional technologies to be layered and leveraged. Local law enforcement information includes data and information from records management systems (RMS), information from police reports, field interview cards, informants, other law enforcement records systems (i.e. motor vehicle, court, probation/parole, etc. Other forensic evidence includes information related to DNA, latent fingerprints, trace evidence (e.g. blood, hairs, fibers, etc.). Technologies to be layered and leveraged includes data and information related to license plate recognition (LPR) systems, commercial and home security cameras, acoustic gunshot detection systems, facial recognition systems, credit card and cell phone tracking data, etc. A particular jurisdiction’s capabilities and policies will determine what is accessible to investigators as it relates to this important crime gun intelligence element.
The more CGI building blocks the better it is for a law enforcement organization charged with preventing, investigating, and prosecuting gun violence. CGI can be many things, sometimes just a single piece of information can be the case breaker, and what that case breaker looks like may well be different from case to case. However, most often, the break will come from a combination of pieces of information and intelligence, which act like steppingstones used to cross a stream. One never knows which piece will be the key one to break the case, so organizations must strive to develop an array of CGI elements. NIBIN and eTrace, both hosted by the ATF, are firearm specific in their scope, but it is the local intelligence component that is much broader in nature. It is its diversity that makes it so powerful, yet, most police agencies have to overlook it because they lack the right smart technologies to exploit and associate the disparate pieces of data. However, with the right solutions local intelligence that can be the great enabler for law enforcement organizations because it can provide context, visualization of the criminal environment, and a common operating picture for stakeholders to share information and collaborate.
Contextual Value
For those agencies engaged in investigating gun crime, the ATF’s NIBIN program has been a vital element. The technology can rapidly link fired cartridge casings to one another, thereby associating different incidents and crime scenes and the guns involved with the end result of providing more investigative leads for investigators to follow up on. Agencies that have refined their ballistic evidence collection and processing protocols have increased the amount of NIBIN leads they generate. This becomes a double edge sword, when agencies are unable to follow up or even prioritize the abundance of NIBIN leads they themselves are generating. Hence the reason why local intelligence is a critical component to the CGI concept. Local intelligence can provide context to better evaluate each NIBIN hit on its own and within a group
While the NIBIN system is a keystone to a strong violent crime suppression capability, it seldom stands on its own. Its limitations center on its inability to consistently provide contextual information to enable investigators to triage the “NIBIN Leads” it provides. In fact, agencies that solely rely on NIBIN to address gun violence are quickly overwhelmed with the deluge of information they encounter particularly if they are in a jurisdiction that has a history of gun violence. Yet, agencies that have used local intelligence – through protocols and technologies – to prioritize their “NIBIN Leads” find that they have a better handle over their crime gun intelligence capabilities.
The underlying reason of why local information and criminal intelligence is desperately needed to understand and triage NIBIN leads has to do with the very nature of these leads. NIBIN leads essentially come in two forms. A NIBIN lead that links a recovered firearm to a crime or series of crimes (“gun to crime”) in and of itself provides investigators with an easy path forward. However, those NIBIN leads that link two or more crimes together (“crime to crime”) are different – as they are not as “ready for prime time.” These leads require additional analysis – against the backdrop of local information and criminal intelligence – to better interpret and understand the common denominators between them. In just about every jurisdiction that is plagued by gun violence, it is the “crime-to-crime” NIBIN leads that represent the overwhelming majority of the agency’s leads.
Unfortunately, many law enforcement agencies that participate in CGI efforts are only following up on the “gun to crime” NIBIN leads because they do not have the smart technological and analytical capabilities to address the larger amount of “crime to crime” NIBIN leads. These agencies feel like they are drowning in the morass of raw crime-to-crime NIBIN leads because very little follow up is done to triage or prioritize these types of leads. Smart technologies that offer a visual backdrop showing the contextual relationships between “crime to crime” NIBIN leads and their underlying associations can increase the amount of follow up that is conducted on the “crime to crime” NIBIN leads.
For the NJSP, in the Atlantic Expressway Shooting investigation outlined above, what they relied on to understand the shooting incident was the visual representation of the relationship between NIBIN, license plate reader (LPR) information, cell phone tracking information, and criminal intelligence. Analysts from the state’s fusion center aided detectives by providing additional layers of information to help piece together the crime, and then locate, and apprehend the offenders. What this agency demonstrated is that with the right mindset, the right information, and the right software solutions to deliver that information to the folks that need it in the moments that mater the most investigations can be culminated in a swift and effective manner.
Visualization
The average person – and for that matter, the average investigator – tends to be visual in terms of the way in which they prefer to process information. Anyone familiar with conspiracy investigations has seen hand drawn diagrams plastered all over the walls of wire intercept room, so investigators can better understand the relationship of those that they are investigating. Understanding this touch point has compelled successful investigators and analysts to explore innovative ways to illustrate the critical associations between the people, places, and things that are all linked to crimes. As it relates to CGI, particularly because the abundance of investigative and forensic information, it becomes paramount for line level investigators to have rapid access to link- association technologies that can illustrate the associations that translate into leads.
Additionally, in the above description of CGI, the core elements are sorted into three buckets. However, it is that last bucket, local information and intelligence, that becomes a bit more complicated for investigators to pour out in their heads. Technologies that allow for the layering of data sets offer investigators opportunities to customize what associations, whether many or a few, they want to see in order to understand the often hidden and complex associations needed to further investigations.
In the Expressway shooting investigation, the NJSP utilized link-association technologies to map shooting events, ballistic evidence, and LPR data. That visualization of data allowed for investigators to rapidly understand what would otherwise be complex scenarios.
Common Operating Picture
A robust CGI capability requires both informal and formal partnerships among diverse entities. In other words, patrol officers, detectives, analysts, ballistic and forensic technicians, commanders, and prosecutors must all partner and think and act together to share information and insight. More specifically, these stakeholders must develop a shared purpose, shape that shared purpose via policy, and then develop protocols to implement and adhere to those policies in order to realize the overall shared vision. The reason these independent stakeholders need to communicate, coordinate, and collaborate becomes even more apparent is when one is asked to think of the amount of time a line officer or detective actually gets to speak with a ballistic examiner or DNA technician. The answer is hardly ever. While it is critically important that each of these entities described above performs a specialized function, the nature of policing or investigations does not often allow these individual disciplines to communicate day-to-day to develop critical information sharing relationships. Add to the mix, these same entities communicating with prosecutors the examples that come to mind are further reduced.
An agency’s ability, or a multi agencies’ ability as in the case with real-time centers and fusion centers, to share an illustrative depiction of the criminal associations between persons, places, and things across a diverse stakeholder community is crucial for defeating gun violence. Providing a common operating picture built around a shared purpose to these stakeholders that may all have a slightly different role in the investigation, or their specific law enforcement mission offers them opportunities to leverage each other’s insights and capabilities. With smart technologies, a common operating picture can be shared across jurisdictions or disciplines. For example, investigators in the field, ballistic technicians, criminal analysts, and prosecutors can all see the same associations uncovered in an investigation, while at the same time offering insights that only their disciplines would know.
Conclusion
Whether violent gun crime is surging in a particular jurisdiction or shooting events are few, the expectation by the public is the same: investigations and prosecutions must be swift, effective, and efficient. Bringing justice to the victims, resolution to their families, and peace to affected communities requires the right balance of people, processes and technology.[2] All “people” involved must think and act together across agencies and jurisdictions, the processes involved must be policy driven, and the relevant technologies must be layered and leveraged.
Having the technological ability to layer, associate, and map the diverse elements of CGI that include a) NIBIN data, eTrace data, and most importantly a jurisdiction’s local intelligence provides investigators, analysts, and prosecutors the ability to draw associations in fact that further both investigations and prosecutions. Additionally, this type of technology is indispensable for commanders to proactively design strategies and operations to suppress violent crime. When this technology is combined with sound policy, good leadership, and robust training programs those charged with combating violent crime increase their chances of success exponentially.
The expressway shooting above is one example of how by providing context, the vital ability to visualize information, and an effective way of sharing it, detectives can turn a chaotic mess on the highway into a successful outcome. After a few days, the investigative team rounded up all suspects on charges of conspiracy to commit murder, murder, weapons offenses, and gang criminality. A year later, the one defendant plead guilty to murder and the others to their individual weapons offenses. More importantly, violent criminals were taken off the street so as not wreak havoc on the highways or their own communities. Great job by the NJSP, who, like other law enforcement agencies globally, are working with technology providers to explore and implement better ways of combating crime in more efficient and effective ways.
